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Abstract
This paper uses data from the PSID to investigate how selective migration aﬀects the
relationship between business cycles and health. We show that, among the healthy, migra-
tion is used to insure against macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. However, among the unhealthy,
there is no relationship between migration and business cycles. In other words, illness
erases a person’s ability to use migration to hedge against business cycle ﬂuctuations. This
suggests that recessions should induce an out-migration of disproportionately healthy peo-
ple from economically depressed areas. This implies that - ceterus paribus - mortality and
morbidity rates should be counter-cyclical.
JEL Classiﬁcation: J10, J61
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11 Introduction
In this paper, we explore how selective migration aﬀects the relationship between business cy-
cles and health. Migration may be an important factor when thinking about this relationship,
because it is well-understood that cities and states that experience economic declines, also ex-
p e r i e n c el a r g eo u t - m i g r a t i o n so fp e o p l e( B l a n c h a r da n dK a t z1 9 9 2 ) . W h a tt h i ss u g g e s t si st h a t
this relationship will depend crucially on exactly who migrates in response to economic shocks.
If it is the case that the people that migrate out of depressed cities tend to be healthier, then
this suggests that, ceterus paribus, morbidity and mortality rates in those areas should decline
during recessions. In contrast, if it is the case that unhealthy people tend to migrate out of
depressed cities, then we should expect the opposite.
To look into this issue, we employ data on geographic mobility, Self Reported Health Sta-
tus (SRHS) and local unemployment rates from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
We ﬁnd that poor health creates additional costs which impede a person’s ability to migrate.
We also show that people tend to migrate from areas with high unemployment to areas with
low unemployment suggesting that migration is used to hedge against business cycle ﬂuctua-
tions. However, we ﬁnd that poor health erases a person’s ability to use migration to hedge
against macroeconomic shocks. Consequently, our results suggest that recessions induce an
out-migration of people who are disproportionately healthy. Finally, we conduct some robust-
ness checks which suggest that reverse causality from migration to health is not impacting our
ﬁndings.
These results shed an interesting light on recent work by Ruhm (2000) who shows that
mortality rates decline during recessions. Ruhm argues that this relationship may be causal. His
2reasoning is that economic lulls may actually improve health-related behaviors since recessions
should tighten the household’s budget constraint, thereby, resulting in people smoking fewer
cigarettes and should relax time constraints, thereby, allowing people to exercise more. Ruhm
(2000 and 2005) provides evidence that, indeed, health-related behaviors do improve during
economic declines. However, if these improvements actually do reduce mortality rates during
recessions, their eﬀe c t sw o u l dh a v et ob es u ﬃciently strong so that they could overcome the
eﬀects of out-migration of healthy people which also occurs during economic declines.
The balance of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section
3 describes our estimation equation. Section 4 describes the main results. Section 5 provides
some robustness checks. Section 6 concludes..
2D a t a
We use data on geographic mobility, SRHS, county unemployment rates and other control vari-
ables from the PSID. Our data cover the years 1984 to 1993.1 The PSID only has data on
SRHS for the heads of the household and their wives. Consequently, throughout this analysis,
we restrict our attention to household heads and their spouses. Since people primarily migrate
in response to business cycle ﬂuctuations in order to relocate to areas with better employment
opportunities, we further restrict our attention to individuals who are below retirement age i.e.
younger than age 65.
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics from our sample. Our migration variable, “Moved?,”
1SRHS data are not available prior to 1984. Location data and unemployment rates are not available after
1993.
3is a dummy variable indicating that the individual has changed states across two successive survey
years.2 This migration variable is commonly used in the literature on internal migration within
the US.3 Looking at the table, we see that 5.8% of the individual-time observations changed
states across survey years. Thus, migration is quite common in our data. Our measure of health
status is SRHS: a categorical variable that takes on integer values between 1 and 5. 1 means
that the individual perceives that their health is excellent; 2 is very good; 3 is good; 4 is fair;
5 is poor. These data are subjective measures. However, there is an extensive literature that
has shown a strong link between SRHS and more objective health outcomes such as mortality
and the prevalence of disease (Mossey and Shapiro 1982; Kaplan and Camacho 1983; Idler and
Kasl 1995; Smith 2003). To measure macroeconomic conditions, we use the unemployment rate
in the individual’s county of residence. Unemployment rates are probably the most appropriate
measure of local macroeconomic conditions in our context given that Blanchard and Katz (1992)
concluded that migration in response to economic shocks is more closely associated with changes
in unemployment than it is with changes in consumption wages.
3 Estimation Equation
Our estimation equation is:
2Unfortunately, data on county of residence is considered sensitive by PSID and, thus, is not publicly available.
Accordingly, our migration variable is whether or not the individual has changed states across successive time
periods rather than whether or not they have changed counties.
3See Gabriel and Schmitz (1994) and Borjas, Bronars and Trejo (1992) for examples.
4Mi,t =
α + Bi,tβ + Gi,tγ + Ui,tφ0 + Ui,t−1φ1+
Ui,t ∗ Bi,tη0 + Ui,t−1 ∗ Bi,tη1 + Ui,t ∗ Gi,tϕ0 + Ui,t−1 ∗ Gi,tϕ1 + Xi,tθ + εi,t.
Mi,t i st h ev a r i a b l e“ M o v e d ? . ” Bi,t is a dummy variable indicating fair or poor health at time t.
Gi,t is dummy variable indicating excellent or very good health at time t.4 The variables on health
status allow us to see how health induces selection in migration. Ui,t is the unemployment rate in
the individual’s county of residence at time t. W ei n c l u d et h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ea tt i m e st and
t − 1. As noted by Blanchard and Katz (1992), one of the main mechanisms by which regions
adjust to employment shocks is migration. Accordingly, we expect that φ0 < 0 and φ1 > 0
so that people migrate from areas with high unemployment to areas with low unemployment.
The interaction terms in the regression equation allow us to see whether people that leave states
as a consequence of employment shocks are disproportionately healthier than those who stay
behind. Xi,t contains other control variables such as age, functions of lagged labor income,
gender dummies, race dummies, education dummies, year dummies and state dummies. We use
functions of lagged income to address the possibility that current migration decisions will aﬀect
future income. Inclusion of Xi,t allows us to ensure that our results are not being driven by an
omitted variables bias. We adjust all standard errors for clustering on individuals to allow for
serial correlation in εi,t within individuals.5
4In Section 5, we also experiment with using lags of the health variables to address any possibility of migration
impacting health.
5We refer the reader to pp. 329-331 of Wooldridge (2000) for a discussion.
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Our main results are reported in Table 2. In column 1, we only include variables on health
status, unemployment and age. Consistent with Halliday (2004), we see that health induces
selection in migration so that good health is associated with a higher probability of migration
and bad health is associated with a lower probability. Looking at the fourth row from the
bottom of the table, we see that the health variables are jointly signiﬁcant at levels higher than
99%. We see that moving from bad health to good health raises the probability of migration by
roughly 0.01 percentage points. Since the unconditional probability of migration in our data is
0.058, this constitutes a large percentage increase. Turning to the unemployment variables, we
see that the estimates of the coeﬃcients on current unemployment rates are negative, whereas
those on lagged unemployment are positive. This is consistent with what we would expect as
this indicates that people tend to migrate from areas with high unemployment to areas with low
unemployment. The interpretation of these coeﬃcients is that if an individual is living in a state
with a low unemployment rate at time t then there is a higher probability that he migrated to
that state between t−1 and t than if the time t unemployment rate were high. In other words,
people tend not to move to depressed states. Conversely, if an individual is living in a state with
a high unemployment rate in t − 1 then there is a higher probability that he will change states
in the coming time period. This ﬁnding is consistent with previous research by Blanchard and
Katz (1992).
In column 2, we add interactions between health and unemployment rates. As indicated by
the third row from the bottom in the table, all the coeﬃcients on unemployment rates and their
6associated interactions are jointly signiﬁcant at levels greater than 99%.6 Next, we see that the
interaction between bad health and current unemployment is positive and the interaction with
lagged unemployment is negative suggesting that the relationship between employment shocks
and migration is attenuated by poor health. In addition, the coeﬃcients on the unemployment
variables and the coeﬃcients on their associated interactions with Bad Health are roughly equal
and opposite so that illness appears to erase a person’s ability to insure against business cycle
ﬂuctuations through migration. Indeed, testing the nulls that H0 : φ0 + η0 =0and that
H0 : φ1 + η1 =0 , we obtain p-values of 0.574 and 0.595, respectively. Finally, we see that
the interaction between good health and current unemployment is negative so that good health
adds on to the eﬀect of business cycle ﬂuctuations on migration. The interaction with lagged
unemployment is essentially zero.
In columns 3 and 4, we include more regressors to ensure that our results are robust to
additional controls. In column 3, we include a comprehensive set of controls for (lagged) labor
supply, (lagged) income, gender, race and education. Compared to column 2, we see that
the eﬀects of health on migration are attenuated somewhat, but are still positive and highly
signiﬁcant. However, the unemployment variables and their associated interactions remain
unchanged and are still jointly signiﬁc a n ta tl e v e l sg r e a t e rt h a n9 9 % . I nc o l u m n4 ,w ea d dy e a r
and state dummies and see that the results are unaﬀected.7
6It is important when interpreting these results to pay careful attention to the tests of joint signiﬁcance at the
bottom of the table. Looking solely at t-statistics to judge the signiﬁcance of the results will tend to be misleading
when assessing the importance of several variables, particularly, when these variables include interactions of one
another which tends to induce correlation across coeﬃcient estimates. Accordingly, it is important to pay special
attention to the F-tests of joint signiﬁcance as these tests have better power.
7All of the empirical results in this paper include the Survey of Economic Opportunities (SEO) - an over-
sample of economically disadvantaged people in the PSID. Since the households in the SEO were chosen because
they were poor, the selection that it induces is endogenous and, thus, conventional weighting schemes are not
appropriate for the SEO. Consequently, some such as Lillard and Willis (1978) have proposed dropping the SEO
75 Robustness Checks
In Table 3, we investigate the robustness of our results to diﬀerent partitions of SRHS. The
table reports the results from three regressions, each of which has the same control variables as
column 4 of Table 2. The ﬁrst column of Table 3 contains both Good Health (Gi,t)a n dB a d
Health (Bi,t) and is, thus, identical to column 4 of Table 2.
In column 2 of Table 3, we include only Bad Health and its associated interactions. We
see that once we exclude Good Health from the regression, the coeﬃcient of Bad Health rises in
absolute terms; its estimate in column 1 is -0.004, whereas its estimate in column 2 is -0.012.
In addition, the interactions between Bad Health and the unemployment rates now have higher
t-statistics, but the point-estimates are similar. The interaction terms in column 2 are jointly
signiﬁcant at the 99% level and are, once again, of equal magnitudes, but of the opposite sign as
the unemployment coeﬃcients.
In column 3, we exclude Bad Health, but include Good Health. The point-estimate on Good
Health is roughly the same, but the coeﬃcient is more tightly estimated. As we saw before,
the interaction between Good Health and the time t unemployment rate is negative and, thus,
indicates that the eﬀects of recessions on migration are magniﬁed for healthier people.
In Table 4, we replicate the regressions in Table 3 except that we now use lagged health
from the sample. Others, however, such as Hyslop (1999) and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) have included the
SEO in their analyses. We also include the SEO as its exclusion substantially reduces our sample size. We
do so because the complicated nature of our regression equation with all of its lagged variables and associated
interactions requires a substantial number of observations for precise estimates. However, we also generated a
set of results that excludes the SEO and, while the estimates were (not surprisingly) slightly less precise, the
estimates were very similar. Essentially, the only eﬀect of dropping the SEO is higher standard errors.
8instead of current health.8 We do this to address any concerns that migration may have a
contemporaneous impact on health. The use of lagged health measures health prior to the
occurrence of the move and, thus, quells any concerns of reverse causality. However, due to
the addition of more lagged variables to the estimation equation, we expect our estimates to be
slightly less precise. Thus, addressing these concerns should come at a cost in terms of eﬃciency.
In column 1, we include both lags of Good Health (Gi,t−1) and Bad Health (Bi,t−1).T h e
coeﬃcient on Good Health is positive and highly signiﬁcant and the coeﬃcient on Bad Health is
also positive (not negative as we have been seeing), but insigniﬁcant. The interactions between
the health variables and the unemployment variables are consistent with Table 2 - although,
the point-estimates are now less precise, as we would expect. The only anomaly among the
interaction terms is the coeﬃcient on the interaction between lagged unemployment and Good
Health (ϕ1) which is now larger in absolute value with the wrong sign. Presumably, this
reﬂects random variation.9 Nevertheless, the other three interactions have the same signs and
magnitudes that we have been seeing and the tests of joint signiﬁcance on the interactions are
signiﬁcant at a level higher than 99%.
In column 2, we exclude Good Health. The coeﬃcient on Bad Health is now negative and
signiﬁcant with a t-statistic of -1.85. The interactions between Bad Health and unemployment
have the same point-estimates as we have been seeing. However, while the unemployment
8Accordingly, we now estimate
Mi,t =
α + Bi,t−1β + Gi,t−1γ + Ui,tφ0 + Ui,t−1φ1+
Ui,t ∗ Bi,t−1η0 + Ui,t−1 ∗ Bi,t−1η1 + Ui,t ∗ Gi,t−1ϕ0 + Ui,t−1 ∗ Gi,t−1ϕ1 + Xi,tθ + εi,t.
9The estimate of this interaction in column 3 of Table 4 is approximately zero providing evidence that this is,
indeed, the case.
9variables together with their interactions with Bad Health are jointly signiﬁcant at the 99%
level, the interaction terms alone are not jointly signiﬁcant - despite having unchanged point-
estimates. Once again, we suspect that this is a consequence of the relative ineﬃciency of this
speciﬁcation.
In column 3, we exclude Bad Health, but we include Good Health. The estimate of the
coeﬃcient on Good Health is similar to what we saw in Column 1. The interaction between
Good Health and time t unemployment has a point-estimate of -0.001 which is consistent with
what we have been seeing. In addition, the interaction between Good Health and time t − 1
unemployment (ϕ1)i sn o wi n s i g n i ﬁcant and very close to zero, which is consistent with what we
saw before in Tables 2 and 3. This lends credence to our earlier assertion that the higher point-
estimate of ϕ1 in column 1 of this table was the consequence of random variation as opposed to
something real in the data.
While there is somewhat of an eﬃciency loss in Table 4, the results in the table are consistent
with the results in Tables 2 and 3. Perusing the results in Tables 3 and 4, one sees that the
point-estimates are strikingly similar in all three speciﬁcations. Thus, we conclude that the only
eﬀect of using lagged health measures in this analysis is higher standard errors. The results in
T a b l e s2a n d3d on o ta p p e a rt ob ea ﬀected in any way by the impact of migration on health.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this .paper, we showed that both health and economic conditions are important determinants
of an individual’s migration decision. First, we provided evidence that poor health creates
additional costs which induce selection in migration. In addition, we provided evidence that
10migration is used to insure against business cycle ﬂuctuations. However, we also found that the
migration costs which are associated with poor health are suﬃciently high that they impede a
person’s ability to use migration to hedge against economic shocks.
These results suggest that cities and states that experience economic declines also experience
an outﬂow of healthy people which should - ceteris paribus - raise mortality and morbidity rates
in depressed areas. This suggests a relationship between recessions and health which is the
opposite of Ruhm (2000) who showed that mortality rates are pro-cyclical. Ruhm (2000 and
2005) suggests that the pro-cyclicality of mortality rates may be a causal relationship by providing
evidence that, during recessions, tobacco use decreases, height-adjusted weight decreases and
leisure time physical activity increases. Ruhm’s explanation for this is that temporary economic
declines decrease the amount of money that people have to buy tobacco and food, and increase
the amount of hours per day that people can potentially use for physical activity. While the
results of this .paper and Ruhm’s analysis are by-no-means incompatible, our results do suggest
that the “healthy living” explanation for the positive eﬀects of recessions on mortality would
have to be suﬃciently strong to overcome the selective out-migration of healthy people from
depressed cities and states.
One issue that warrants further investigation if we are to conclude that Ruhm’s results are
causal concerns measurement error in mortality rates resulting from migration. Mortality rates
for a given period of time are typically calculated using the population of a city, state or country
at the beginning of the time period as the denominator and the number of deaths that occur in
that location during the time period as the numerator. Thus, in the presence of out-migration
(in-migration) from (into) an area, mortality rates will be downwardly (upwardly) biased simply
11because there are fewer (more) people who could possibly die in that location (Abraído-Lanza,
et al 1999; Palloni and Arias 2003). This suggests that even in the absence of a “healthy
living” eﬀect, we should still expect a negative eﬀect of recessions on mortality due to migration.
However, this would be a spurious correlation, not a causal relationship.
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Individuals Assessmento fT h e i rO w nH e a l t h
1 = Excellent; 2 = Very Good; 3 = Good;







































= 1 if the individual is black 0.30
(0.46)
∗Refers to individual-time observations.
15Table 2: Core Empirical Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Age Quadratic? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sex Dummy? No No Yes Yes
Race Dummies? No No Yes Yes
Education Dummies? No No Yes Yes
Year Dummies? No No No Yes
State Dummies? No No No Yes
R2 0.011 0.011 0.015 0.026
H0: β = γ =0
∗∗∗ p =0 .000 p =0 .000 p =0 .000 p =0 .000
H0: φ0= φ1= η0= η1= ϕ0= ϕ1 =0 ∗∗∗ - p =0 .000 p =0 .000 p =0 .000
H0: η0= η1= ϕ0= ϕ1=0 ∗∗∗ - p =0 .000 p =0 .003 p =0 .004
H0: φ0+η0=0 ∗∗∗ - p =0 .574 p =0 .587 p =0 .622
H0: φ1+η1=0 ∗∗∗ - p =0 .595 p =0 .671 p =0 .759
Individual-Time Observations 82315 82315 82145 82145
∗t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All standard errors cluster on individuals.
∗∗The greek letters in paranetheses are the coeﬃcient names for each variable.
∗∗∗p-values are reported for the F test of each null.
16Table 3: Alternantive Speciﬁcations - Diﬀerent Partions of SRHS
(1) (2) (3)






















Good Health ∗ Unemployment






Good Health ∗ Unemployment





Bad Health ∗ Unemployment





Bad Health ∗ Unemployment






R2 0.026 0.026 0.026
F-test on Unemployment and
Associated Interactions∗∗∗ p =0 .000 p =0 .000 p =0 .000
F-test on Unemployment/Health
Interactions∗∗∗ p =0 .004 p =0 .005 p =0 .003
H0: φ0+η0=0 ∗∗∗ p =0 .622 p =0 .618 -
H0: φ1+η1=0 ∗∗∗ p =0 .759 p =0 .762 -
Individual-Time Observations 82145 82145 82145
∗t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All standard errors cluster on individuals.
∗∗The greek letters in paranetheses are the coeﬃcient names
for each variable.
∗∗∗p-values are reported for the F test of each null.
+The regression results in each column of the table include the same
control variables in column 4 of Table 2.
17Table 4: Alternantive Speciﬁcations - Lagged Health Measures
(1) (2) (3)






















Good Health at Time t − 1 ∗ Unemployment






Good Health at Time t − 1∗ Unemployment





Bad Health at Time t − 1∗ Unemployment





Bad Health atTime t − 1∗ Unemployment






R2 0.026 0.026 0.026
F-test on Unemployment and
Associated Interactions∗∗∗ p =0 .000 p =0 .007 p =0 .000
F-test on Unemployment/Health
Interactions∗∗∗ p =0 .002 p =0 .412 p =0 .001
H0: φ0+η0=0 ∗∗∗ p =0 .5866 p =0 .589 -
H0: φ1+η1=0 ∗∗∗ p =0 .9733 p =0 .977 -
Individual-Time Observations 82145 82145 82145
∗t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All standard errors cluster on individuals.
∗∗The greek letters in paranetheses are the coeﬃcient names
for each variable.
∗∗∗p-values are reported for the F test of each null.
+The regression results in each column of the table include the same
control variables in column 4 of Table 2.
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